Managing Cyber Risk and Security In Cloud Computing by Sheikh, Jahid & Malviya, Bhupendra
International Journal of Advanced Computer Technology (IJACT) 
ISSN: 2319-7900              www.ijact.org                 Volume IX, Issue IV, July-August 2020 
1 
 
  Managing Cyber Risk and Security In Cloud Computing 
Jahid Sheikh, Bhupendra Malviya 




Abstract—Cloud computing provides outsourcing of 
resources bringing economic benefits. The outsourcing 
however does not allow data owners to outsource the 
responsibility of confidentiality, integrity and access 
control, as it still is the responsibility of the data owner. 
As cloud computing is transparent to both the 
programmers and the users, it induces challenges that 
were not present in previous forms of distributed 
computing. Furthermore, cloud computing enables its 
users to abstract away from low-level configuration 
such as configuring IP addresses and routers. It creates 
an illusion that this entire configuration is automated. 
This illusion is also true for security services, for instance 
automating security policies and access control in cloud, 
so that individuals or end-users using the cloud only 
perform very high-level (business oriented) 
configuration. This paper investigates the security 
challenges posed by the transparency of distribution, 
abstraction of configuration and automation of services 
by performing a detailed threat analysis of cloud 
computing across its different deployment scenarios 
(private, bursting, federation or multi-clouds). This 
paper also presents a risk inventory which documents 
the security threats identified in terms of availability, 
integrity and confidentiality for cloud infrastructures in 
detail for future security risks. We also propose a 
methodology for performing security risk assessment for 
cloud computing architectures presenting some of the 
initial results.  
Keywords-security threats; risk assessment; cloud 
computing  
I. INTRODUCTION  
Cloud computing has been promoted as a new 
paradigm and the 5th utility service after water, 
electricity, gas and telephony [7, 11]. In the past, 
enterprises supported their business by procuring IT 
infrastructure and developing their software on top of 
that infrastructure. Cloud computing presents a model 
in which IT infrastructure is leased and used according 
to the need of the enterprise. The benefit of this model 
is that it converts capital expenditure of an enterprise 
into operational expenditure [5]. The most 
comprehensive definition of cloud computing was 
made by National Institute of Standard and Technology 
(NIST) [12] where cloud is described as a convenient 
model using efficient computing resources stressing on 
four deployment models. Private cloud is solely 
operated for an organization by either itself or a third 
party. Public cloud is available for general public use 
and is owned by an organization selling cloud services. 
Community cloud provides an infrastructure that is 
shared by several organizations, also called federation 
of clouds. Hybrid cloud is a composition of two, more 
clouds or multi-clouds (community, private, 
public).While cloud computing is another way of 
implementing distributed systems; it is unique such 
that the infrastructure is transparent to users and 
programmers alike. This allows new ways of selling 
and sharing resources altogether. Cloud computing 
offers a new economic model which enables 
enterprises to shift from the conventional way of 
developing their own IT departments to outsourcing 
their needs of software, platform and infrastructure. 
We envision that this shift would enable hybrid clouds 
to become a commonplace, realized by private clouds 
interacting with a rich eco system of various different 
types of cloud. We are already witnessing research 
being conducted to enable organizations to 
automatically externalize services and applications to 
trustworthy and auditable cloud providers in the 
hybrid model [6].  
Each of these deployment scenarios can 
bring a number of challenges in various aspects of the 
clouds like risks on the infrastructures, data 
protection or security. Across these models, security 
requirements can be associated with interoperability, 
reliability, portability, maintainability, availability, 
integrity and confidentiality. These will also differ 
depending on the point of view of the involved actors; 
for instance, the end user or cloud consumer may 
have concerns about their data usage, whereas the 
service providers would be concerned over malicious 
intent. Various policies for authentication and 
software assurances are used to build confidence of 
customers to use clouds. This paper presents the 
security issues faced in cloud computing and analyses 
it as a risk measure of the providers involved in the 
cloud – the service provider (SP) and the 
infrastructure provider (IP). Section II explains the 
motivation and presents the background for the 
security issues that need to be addressed in clouds. 
Section III explains a systematic approach for threat 
analysis based on standard threats for distributed 
systems, adopted in cloud computing. The 
methodology discussed uses the CORAS risk 
modelling methodology [3] coupled with Information 
Risk Analysis Methodology (IRAM), using the Threat 
and Vulnerability Assessment tool (T&VA) performed 
using data provided by the Information Security 
Forum (ISF) [9] and public data [12] tailoring for 
specific cloud computing security risk assessment. 
This research is exploited into a risk model for 
security and presented in Section IV with an 
evaluation of the suggested methodology. The results 
have been based on the implementation work carried 
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out in an EU-project OPTIMIS [6] presenting analyses 
across different deployment scenarios. Section V 
presents related security research in cloud 
computing. Finally Section VI presents the 
conclusions of the risk modelling methodology and 
future research directions to adopt using it.  
 
II.PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Computer and information security are concerned 
with ensuring the availability, integrity and 
confidentiality of information. Availability is concerned 
with the information being accessible when needed, 
whereas integrity refers to not allowing data to be 
modified without being undetected. Confidentiality is 
concerned with the disclosure of data to unauthorized 
personnel.  
 
Figure 1: Example of a security threat analysis for 
data loss 
 
Figure 2. Cloud scenarios. (Private involves one 
deploying and one operating provider, bursting - the 
operation provider can burst to another provider, 
federation - a team of providers work together, multi - 
the service can be deployed on a number of providers, 
acts as a broker) 
Each of these aspects covers an integral part of security 
aspects of the infrastructure. In cloud computing, 
security is one of the highest concerns as it can make or 
break deals by either convincing organizations to use 
or deferring its use on security concerns. For instance, 
Microsoft [4] employs a threat modelling technique to 
keep security concerns intact, while [1] discusses how 
security needs an in-depth threat analysis to be done 
for every unit in the system. Others [2] have identified 
policies and control, knowledge and performance 
management by using risk, audits, SLA monitoring and 
protection policies for clouds. Threat analysis helps 
create a preliminary investigation protecting various 
assets and prevent certain threats from happening. 
Figure 1 depicts an example of the analysis of a data 
loss threat identifying assets and protection techniques 
such as security audits and hardware wipe policies. The 
different cloud deployment scenarios raise different 
kinds of threats depending on how the service executes 
on the infrastructures. These have been depicted in 
Figure 2.   
III.PROPOSED SOLUTION 
Risk analysis can be considered at various phases of 
interactions in clouds (Figure 3). Each provider 
involved in the cloud will have security concerns from 
their own point of view towards the others in terms of 
trust [22], service risks or legal issues. They might 
consider the risk of working with other providers or 
may have specific security demands that need to be 
honoured. These assessments also depend on the cloud 
deployment scenarios - private, public or hybrid. 
   
 
Figure 3.  Risk assessment lifecycle during service 
deployment/operation  
These concerns can also be refined depending on the 
stage of the cloud lifecycle – deployment or operation. 
Risk needs to be assessed at service deployment stage 
for initial placement of services on cloud providers, 
and the service operation, where cloud resources and 
data are managed by the cloud provider to fulfil the 
Service Level Objectives. During deployment and 
operation stages, risk needs to be constantly 
monitored in order to prevent any additional costs to 
be incurred to the end-users and cloud providers. A 
number of stages have been identified for performing a 
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complete risk assessment on clouds by considering 
core risk assessment approaches as explained below:  
A. High level analysis of the system  
An initial high-level analysis of the deployment 
scenarios helps identifying the actions and assets 
involved at the different stages in the cloud. This helps 
isolate the assets involved and how they change over 
time to identify the vulnerabilities of the cloud 
environment. Generally security needs to be assessed 
before deployment of the service to check for security 
concerns of the other provider or if service level 
agreements (SLAs) demand certain security aspects to 
be met (Figure 3). During the operation, security 
concerns are monitored while the service is executing.  
B. Identifying the assets involved  
There are various assets involved either at the 
deployment or operation stage such as the SLA or 
customer data. These can be monitored in relation to 
the specific threats in the environment.  
C. Identify the threats in each cloud deployment scenario  
Threat modelling is a systemic approach by which 
threats and vulnerabilities of a system can be 
identified. The information risk analysis methodology 
is coupled with the threat and vulnerability 
assessment tool (T&VA) because it contains a threat 
model for distributed systems and software in 
general. This model has been adapted to cloud 
applications using the CORAS risk modelling 
technique [3]. We have adapted a formal risk 
methodology, CORAS to further substantiate and filter 
the threats coming in from the T&VA.   
In this paper, threat classification is based on two 
sources of information, the information security 
forum [38] for providing data on attacks on IT 
systems and the frequency of attacks and the public 
data on attacks on the cloud platforms such as 
Amazon EC2 and Google Apps Engine. The T&VA  
[36] Provides a standard list of threats relating to IT 
systems, adopting the threats relevant to the cloud 
deployment scenarios being investigated. Further 
threats have been added to introduce the differences 
between cloud computing and other forms of 
distributed computing. These have been listed in 
Table 1. The main threats are Data Leakage, Usage 
Control and Hypervisor level attacks and these have 
been classified into the following six categories:  
1. External attacks: These include all the 
threats in scenarios involving use of public 
infrastructures. Examples include problems with 
Amazon public cloud [40], using audits such as that of 
SAS type 2 audit [20] and ISO 27001 [24]. These 
threats can lead to loss of confidentiality and integrity 
as multiple enterprises using provider services 
require development of technical and legal safe guard 
for the protection of identities. In [39] attack services 
are defined in which cloud platforms can be infected 
with malicious code. An example is Bluepill that can 
infect hypervisor which can then be used to control 
the virtual machines (VMs) [41]. In Amazon EC2 
cloud, it was used to distribute spam which lead to 
the banning of EC2 related IP addresses by anti spam 
groups [27].  
2. Theft: Cloud computing supports multi 
tenant architecture in which multiple users can 
consume the same computing resources allowing 
possible theft of data.  Potential adversaries can use 
advance data recovery tools to recover data owned by 
other customers. Google in its security data sheet 
mentions that only references to the data are deleted 
rather than data itself. The likelihood of this threat 
being exploited is low but some companies employ 
high end physical security measures to secure data. 
3. System malfunction: A bug in the cloud 
software used can have adverse consequences. The 
likelihood of this threat is high and is classified as one 
of the most frequent. 
4. Service interruption: Natural disasters like 
earthquakes can lead to the interruption of service  
5. . System overload causes excessive system 
activity leading to the degradation of performance 
such as the unavailability of services. Although 
theoretically, cloud computing offers unlimited 
amount of computing resources, it still depends on 
how the websites or the cloud services are configured 
and the availability zone they reside in. Wikileaks 
used EC2 platform to host their website, protecting 
against DoS attacks by paying a high end package to 
protect their website. The threat is difficult to 
recognize as it is challenging to distinguish between a 
genuine peaks in demand for usage of cloud services 
with a DoS attack as both create similar patterns of 
data usage. 5. Human error: Infrastructure providers 
like EC2 have designed automated systems with no 
human intervention for provisioning of cloud 
services. However, once provisioned human errors 
cannot be controlled. It is hard to predict human 
behaviour. Therefore we classify this threat as a high 
threat [9]. Google Apps in its SLAs promise 0.01% for 
data outages but does not take responsibility for data 
loss due to human error The IT policy compliance 
group suggests that 75% of all data loss is due to user 
error  
6. System specific threats and abuse: Data Leakage is 
defined as an unauthorized transmission of data (or 
information) from within an organization to an 
external destination or recipient, in electronic form or 
by a physical method 
. This threat becomes more critical in cloud 
environments as enterprises who are hosting their 
data on clouds have no control over the provider's 
infrastructure. In cloud specific environments where 
data from multiple enterprises may reside in the same 
data centre, it is necessary to build controls for data 
access. This threat has been classified as medium by 
GoogleDocs. Hypervisor level attacks enable an 
adversary to exploit vulnerability at the virtualization 
layer that is running underneath the VMs. There are 
numerous attacks that have been recorded at the 
hypervisor level ranging from the injection of malware 
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to the hijacking of a VM by a thin undetectable 
hypervisor, classifying this as a high threat  
Table 1 lists the various threats identified along 
with the stage of the cloud lifecycle these threats may 
be active. The table also includes the classification of 
the threats in confidentiality, availability and integrity 
using the information risk rating.   
D. High-level analysis of each threat  
Each of the threats can be further analyzed in terms of 
who causes them and the incidents leading up to them, 
which can then be prioritized depending on this 
information. This also helps measure the impact of the 
security risk on the service and the providers. Figure 4 
depicts an example of the hacking threat and its related 
asset and vulnerabilities.  
  
 
Figure 4. Analysing the threat Hacking 
E. Risk Evaluation  
Depending on the priority of the assets and 
likelihoods of the threats occurring, the threat items 
can be plotted into an evaluation matrix to document 
their occurrences. Table 2 depicts this in relation to 
the threats identified in Table 1. The likelihood and 
impact rating is set using the data collected [9, 12]. 
The impact also denotes the affect the threat will 
have on the business such as loss of confidentiality 
can cause loss in trust having the highest impact 
(Table 3).  
 
Table 2: Risk evaluation matrix 
 
Table 3: Range of threats for Confidentiality, 
Availability and Integrity 
 
Threats belonging to confidentiality are classed as 
high because these have severe effect on trust and 
the provider's image. Loss of confidentiality can also 
convert low threats like theft of information to very 
high. For instance losing unencrypted data is a more 
severe risk compared to loss of encrypted data.  
Loss of availability is relatively classified as medium 
compared to loss of confidentiality. This is because 
enterprises are better off using infrastructure 
provider’s resources rather than deploying their own 
because of the investment involved. Examples 
include Bitbuket website continuing the use the EC2 
even when further attacks are recorded. 
Integrity is classed as low because relative to 
confidentiality and availability the impact is much 
lower. Loss of integrity can be because of software 
error, user error, and equipment failure and also due 
to an adversary changing data. From the recorded 
attacks on cloud platforms, it is difficult to find the 
reasons for the threats; additionally the VMs can also 
be restarted and redeployed on different 
infrastructures to counteract these threats.   
F. Risk Treatment  
Once evaluated, the risk mitigation strategies can be 
generated in terms of the actions taken to resolve 
them. These can be to accept, treat or outsource the 
risk. For instance, in a situation of multiple login, the 
system logs can be scanned to detect this. Once 
observed the system administrator can be made aware 
to take appropriate action on the user account.   
           IV.SIMULATION &IMPLEMENTATION 
Security risk assessment needs to be done at the 
service deployment and operation stages of the 
infrastructure provider's (IP) cloud lifecycle. Figure 5, 
6 describes the architectural details of the risk 
components involved at deployment and operation 
stages of the cloud lifecycle.   
 
 
Figure 5. Security risk assessment at the deployment 
stage of the cloud   
At the deployment stage, the risk assessment tool will 
read inputs from the risk inventory which documents 
all the threats, the vulnerabilities, assets affected and 
their likelihoods. The risk inventory is based on the 
threats collected in Table 1. Based on this information, 
security risk can be calculated as: 
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1. Calculate the number of threats recorded at 
deployment stage and usecase 
2. For each threat:   
a. probability of likelihood given asset affected (p(B|A)) 
= likelihood/ 5.0  
b. probability of asset priority (p(A)) = priority/5.0  
c. probability of likelihood regardless of asset (p(B))= 
p(B|A) * p(A) + p(A') *1    
d. probability of threat occurring (p(A|B)) = ((p(B|A) * 
p(A))) / p(B)    
3. Security risk = Sum all probabilities of threats 
occurring / threats found 
Based on rules of Bayesian dependencies, the 
probability of each threat affecting the particular assets 
can be calculated before making the decision to accept 
the service by the IP.  
 
 
Figure 6. Security risk assessment at the operation 
stage of the cloud   
However at the operation stage, along with the 
calculated security risk for this stage, the risk 
assessment tool will be interacting with the 
monitoring database and additional tools like the 
network and historical database to monitor if certain 
threats are becoming live.  The stages 1-2 are similar 
to the deployment stage but in addition new stages 
are added for operation phase. The historical 
database can contain details of previously recorded 
threats that have occurred in the past. The network 
can include intrusion detection systems and logs 
which can be parsed to find out if certain events have 
been recorded [22].   
Security_risk_operation (usecase) 
3. Security risk = Sum all probabilities of threats 
occurring / threats found  
4. For each threat to be monitored:  
     4a. Read monitoring inputs  
     4b. If (event found==true) count ++  
5. Calculate total_event_rate= events_found/ total 
monitored time  
6. Relative risk (RR)= total_event_rate/ security risk  
7. If RR=1 do nothing, RR<1 accept risk, If RR>1 apply 
mitigation strategy 
Depending on the value of relative risk (RR), the 
components can make a decision whether to accept 
or apply a mitigation strategy stored in the risk 
inventory to compensate for the risk. The risk is 
mitigated during the same time period. Figure 7 
shows the output of 20 simulated samples collected 
while executing the risk model during the operation 
phase. Depending on the event rate per sample the 
relative risk can be calculated according to the 
algorithm step 6. If the relative risk is less than 1, the 
software can choose to accept the risk but if higher, 
the mitigation strategy will get activated which may 
ask for human intervention as the risk is going high.  
 
 
Figure 7: Calculating relative risk using samples 
and event rates. An action is taken when 
relative risk is more than 1.  
 
 V. CONCLUSION 
From the threat analysis performed, we have shown 
that the information security principles of integrity, 
confidentiality and availability are most relevant to the 
cloud related scenarios. The information risk ratings 
performed shows the loss of confidentiality is rated as 
the highest level of risk followed by availability and 
integrity. For each of the threat categories the common 
research issues identified are:  
• Scalable fine granular access control and data 
confidentiality in cloud computing scenarios.  
• Using an intrusion detection system 
(Identification of user behaviour) to prevent 
data leakage at the infrastructure provider 
level.   
• Detection of malware on virtual machines, 
from the hypervisor level by performing static 
and dynamic analysis.  
• Identification of vulnerabilities at the 
hypervisor when giving API level access to the 
introspective layer of the hypervisor to the 
programmers.  
• Security architecture for a hypervisor using 
the Usage control model [8].  
The risk model presented here allows monitoring 
threats based on the events being logged by the 
detectors leading to a calculation of the relative risk. 
However, a fine granular analysis needs to be 
performed on threats which are difficult to detect via 
certain events or have a cause and effect relationship 
to other threats. These may be more specific to 
confidentiality or integrity classifications of the threats. 
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Further future work includes testing this system on a 
cloud platform with monitoring agents installed which 
will log certain threats when they occur. This will then 
be extended to work on determine threats which may 
be eventually seen based on the data being collected 
and difficult to determine directly from the events. 
Finally the results from the initial testing and 
evaluation, advocate that the risk model does correctly 
assess and prioritize the risk.   
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